This brief essay is intended as an introduction to the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. It can be read in roughly 20 minutes. Although it doesn’t nearly contain all of the historical information on the conflict, it should serve as a good first reading about what events have led up to today’s bloody and horrific situation.

The essay begins with a few words on the deep history of the conflict, and quickly moves into more recent events. The essay was updated on January 13, 2002. Originally, this essay was written in December 2000, after the author (Erik Love) spent 6 months of intense study on this issue. This small amount of study hardly qualifies me as an expert on this issue, and I do not claim to be an expert by any means, but the history I present here and my interpretation of current events may serve as a starting point for your own investigation of the situation in the Middle East. That’s my humble goal here.

All comments are welcome: erik@eriklove.com. Your comments will be posted on my website if you wish. For more information and articles by people far more qualified than I, please visit http://www.eriklove.com/conflict.html

Thanks for reading.

The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most closely watched and most complicated international conflicts of the twentieth century, defies easy, neat, and simple explanation. I write this open letter after an intense six-month study of the conflict during which I spent about three months (non-consecutively) in Palestine and Israel during the year 2000. Originally, I expected at the end of this study to write a clear-cut and somewhat decisive account of the conflict. Certainly, six months of study and three months of living “in the conflictEwould aid me in this endeavor. Well, although I certainly have a clearer understanding of the conflict, explaining it has become anything but easy, neat, and simple.

Indeed, the more I learn about the conflict, it becomes less easy to define the key issues and harder to articulate what I think should be done to bring about peace. This conflict exists in a land divided not only by who is Israeli and who is Palestinian, but also by several other “internalEconflicts on each side. When talking to Palestinians or Israelis, and telling them that I was “studying the conflict,Every often the response I received was an honestly confused “Which conflict?Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> Since each side is multifaceted, very few definite blanket statements ring completely true. Moreover, there are very few undisputed “factsEin this conflict. Virtually any statement of “factEmust take a side, implicitly. Objectivity here is basically impossible E even the names of places and things are political.

In spite of all these difficulties, I am here to present my opinions on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. I make no guarantees of objectivity, simplicity, or conclusiveness. Still, I hope to make this account accessible, relevant, and insightful. It is my hope that people with little knowledge about the conflict can read this as an introduction and come away with a basic understanding of the history and the current situation in the conflict.
A Brief History

Our first difficulty Ewhere to begin. Some say the history of this conflict dates back to ancient times, when the Torah says the Jews inhabited the land of Eretz Israel. Others say the conflict truly begins in the late 1800’s with the beginning of the Zionist movement. To compromise, we’ll give cursory treatment to both interpretations. We’ll begin with an overview of ancient history through the 20^th century. Then, we’ll detail the major events and trends in the conflict from the early 20^th century through 2000.

FIGURE 1

Ancient Kingdom of Israel

“The kingdom of Israel reached the height of its existence and included the most territory under the reign of King David (1000E61 BC). Its borders stretched far beyond present-day Israeli borders and included parts of what is now Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.E/span>

Microsoft Map^{^[1]}

Ancient History through the 16^th Century

Archeological data and the Torah indicate the presence of a Kingdom of Israel in Canaan (ancient Palestine) dating from about 1020 BCE (see Figure 1). This Kingdom became divided among several Jewish tribes and was eventually conquered by the Assyrians in 721 BCE. The Temple, Judaism’s holiest shrine, was destroyed, and the Jews were expelled to the Kingdom of Judah in the Negev desert. Centuries later, however, the Jews retook Jerusalem and Israel under the leadership of Cyrus the Great, and they rebuilt the Temple in 516 BCE. But, again, in 168 BCE, King Antiochus IV and the Syrians took Jerusalem, destroyed the temple and declared Judaism illegal. Two attempts by the Jews to retake the land in 66 and 132 CE proved unsuccessful, and the land of Israel was renamed Syria Palaistina. The land was then ruled from Rome for about five centuries. In 638 CE, the Arab Caliphate over the land Ethen called Filastin Ebegan. For the next millennium, Filastin saw relative peace where slowly most of the inhabitants converted to Islam, but self-reliant communities of Christians and Jews (“People of the BookE remained. Several minor shifts of power took place over these thousand years, but overall the area became predominantly Arab. The last major shift of power before the 20^th century occurred when the Ottomans conquered the rulers of Palestine (the Mamelukes) in 1517. The Ottomans controlled Palestine from the 16^th through the 20^th century.^{^[2]}

Why is all this relevant? Well, a common claim of Israelis involves their “historic rightEto the land in Israel. Israelis often argue that since Jews originally lived there, they have a right to “resettleEthere. In my view, this argument is problematic. Before the establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, Palestine had gone through several different political empires through history, only two of which were Jewish. There is no evidence to prove that the Kingdom of Israel was the first or most influential political power to inhabit the land. Still, Zionists assert that the Jewish people have a right to “returnEto Israel. Indeed, no other ethnic group has been allowed to exert any historic rights to any territory to the extent the Israelis have.

In any event, Jews lived in Palestine peacefully through the 19^th century Eit wasn’t until the rise of Zionism in the late 1800’s that Jews asserted a “historic rightEto Palestine.

The 20^th Century

At the end of the 19^th century, Palestine consisted of small, relatively disconnected, ethnically diverse agrarian communities. Jews, Christians, and Muslims lived in the region with little conflict under Ottoman rule. It wasn’t until the 1880s that the Arab majority in the region began to express their own political nationalism distinct from the Ottomans.[3]

At the same time, Jews in the Diaspora faced mounting discrimination, particularly in Europe. The shetel ghettos and the violent Russian pogroms (state-sponsored massacres of Jews) exemplify the horrific conditions and anti-Semitism that Jews met near the turn of the 20^th century. In this environment, Theodor Herzl initiated the rise of political Zionism, or Jewish Nationalism. The idea that Eretz Israel, or Palestine, could serve as the rightful land for a Jewish state drove this movement. Such a State of Israel, they reasoned, would solve the problems of discrimination in Europe. Palestine seemed the logical location for this state because of its historical and religious significance to Judaism. Jewish migration from Europe to Israel with the intention of building a state there began around 1904 and lasted until 1923.[4]

Simultaneously, in 1918, the British Empire gained political control over Palestine after the breakup of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I. In the process of gaining this Mandate over Palestine, the British issued what later became known as the “three promisesE regarding the eventual control of Palestine. To encourage Arab cooperation against the Ottomans during WWI, the British promised independence for the Arab areas of the Ottoman Empire (including Palestine) in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence through 1915 and 1916. The Arabs subsequently held up their end of the bargain Ethey revolted against the Ottomans in 1916. But after the war ended, the British insisted that they never promised independence for Palestine.

One reason for this inconsistency may be another, secret agreement the British made which contradicts the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, between the British and French took place in 1916 Earound the same time as the Hussein-McMahon correspondence. In this agreement between the British and French regarding the control of the defunct Ottoman territory, the British agreed to place Palestine under “international administrationE(not Arab independence) after the war. The British further departed from their position in the Hussein-McMahon correspondence with the 1917 Balfour Declaration, where they expressed “sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> This declaration promised that the British would “use their best endeavors to facilitate the achievement of [a national Home for the Jewish people]Eit being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in PalestineE. Overall, the political status of Palestine at the end of WWI was anything but clear. It seems fair to say that the British had control of the region, and they were clearly pro-Zionist. Palestinian Arab resentment for the lack of local control in Palestine began to increase.[5]

It was during this social and political unease in Palestine that Jewish immigration increased significantly with the rise of Nazism in Europe. At first, around 1920, Palestinian reaction to Jewish immigration involved sporadic expressions of anger at the Jewish confiscation of land. Individual families had lived on much of this land for generations through absentee landowners. In other words, Zionist immigrants purchased Palestinian land from people who technically owned the land, but these absentee landowners did not live on their land in Palestine, and usually gave no notice to the Palestinian families who had lived there for hundreds of years that their land was about to be sold. Through this and other means including a strict anti-Palestinian economic policy (no Palestinian workers on Zionist land and no Zionists in Palestinian shops), Zionists quickly became a substantial minority in Palestine (over one-third of the population) in the late 1930’s. Resentment for their presence increased.

These new Zionists were unlike the Jews who lived peacefully in Palestine before the 1920’s. The European Zionists wanted to transform Palestine into a European-like place. They had no interest in adapting to the culture and environment already present in Palestine Ethey wanted to transplant their own culture into Eretz Israel.[6]

What at first was a sporadic reaction to the Zionist immigration quickly turned into a full scale, organized resistance movement in the 1930’s. A revolt against continued Zionist immigration began in 1936 that the British were unable to control until 1939. To put down the rebellion, the British employed “emergency regulationsEincluding curfews, collective fines, abolishment of political parties, censorship of the press, and general martial law in the region. Without any further recourse, the Palestinians continued to be forced off their land. Just as the Arab revolt ended, World War II began.[7]

During the war, the Zionist movement continued to gain support. It was after the war, though, that the international community truly supported the Zionists in their reaction to the horror of the Holocaust. For example, the United Nations, a newly formed body, voted on a proposal in 1947 designed to end British control of Palestine and settle the dispute between Arabs and Zionists there. UN Resolution 181 (see Figure 2) partitioned Palestine into two rather non-contiguous blocs of territory, and declared Jerusalem “corpus separatumEunder UN control. The resolution gave the Zionists more than half (57%) of the land of historic Palestine including the most productive land along the coast. Just to compare: in 1947 the Zionists represented about a third of the population in Palestine and owned only seven percent of historic Palestine. The UN’s own data indicate that the Jewish state as defined by Resolution 181 would have had more Palestinians than Jews, and it would have had economic revenues about three times that of the Palestinian state.[8]

FIGURE 2

UN Partition Plan in Resolution 181

Map Courtesy of the Israeli Government[9]

1948 EIndependence and Catastrophe[10]

After the UN vote for partition, the Zionists had official international law behind their movement. The Arabs, on the other hand, saw the partition plan as unjust Eit put Arab-owned land under Zionist control with no compensation or alternative. The situation in Palestine became violent and unstable.

As the international community worked to make a more just solution to the problem, the State of Israel was declared by David Ben-Gurion on May 14, 1948. The bordering Arab states declared war on Israel, but against Israel’s French- and American-supplied weapons, they were eventually unsuccessful. Also, Jordan did not attack as vehemently as it could have because of a secret deal between King Abdullah and the Zionists to share Palestine.

At the end of the War for Independence or Al Nakba (Catastrophe), depending on your point of view, Israel remained standing on all of its present-day hinterland E77% of historic Palestine (see Figure 3). In other words, the Zionists took even more land (see Figure 3) than the 57% given to them by the UN. Jordan took the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip fell under Egyptian jurisdiction. Many Palestinians fled or were forced to flee their homes in what was now Israel proper, and they continued to do so after the end of the war.

FIGURE 3

Israel from 1948-1967

This map, courtesy of the Israeli government[11], shows the West Bank as “Samaria and Judea.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> Jerusalem is seen as divided. Note that the State of Israel exists on more land than allotted to it by UN Resolution 181 (Figure 2).

From 1948 until the next major war in 1967, the new State of Israel had relative calm. The state grew in population exponentially as Jews from all over the world came to settle there. The Palestinians who remained in the West Bank found themselves de facto citizens of Jordan, and saw their nationalist ideas quashed because the Jordanians wanted the West Bank to be firmly a part of Jordan. The Gazan Palestinians found their land neglected by Egypt, and the small Gaza Strip quickly became overcrowded and the conditions there became awful.

1967 War and The Occupation

In June 1967, Israel launched an attack on Egypt and Jordan. At the time, the Israelis claimed that their strike was in response to an Egyptian offensive. Later, Israel stated that this was a “pre-emptiveEstrike to head off an Egyptian attack. Egypt insists, though, that despite somewhat hostile rhetoric (the norm between Israel and Egypt at the time), their army was fighting in Yemen in 1967 and there was no way they could have attacked Israel Eand the Israelis were aware of this. In either case, Israel attacked, and just six days later they destroyed Egypt’s air force and easily disposed of Jordan’s army as well. Israel occupied East Jerusalem (including the Old City and its religious sites) and the West Bank and took the Gaza Strip. At the same time, Israel took the Golan Heights from Syria and the Sinai Peninsula from Egypt.[12]

Eventually, Israel gave the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt as part of a peace treaty (which is still in effect today). Israel still occupies the Golan Heights, the West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Additionally, in regards to their occupation they actively ignore international law. Israel has refused to grant the people in the occupied territories citizenship, and instead they have maintained military control there. Israel also has moved its own population into their occupied territories Ea violation of the fourth Geneva Convention. Some Israelis insist that they have the right to live anywhere in Eretz Israel Eincluding the West Bank and Gaza Strip Eand they have built over 200 settlements to that effect. The Israeli army guards those settlements and the settlers living there have full Israeli citizenship. Their presence continues to be one of the major flashpoints of the conflict.

The United Nations Security Council, in November 1967, issued Resolution 242 calling for the end of the occupation of all territory gained in the 1967 war, including East Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza, Sinai, and Golan Heights. This resolution has been ignored by Israel, and Israel has faced no consequences because of this action.

The Arab states surrounding Israel tried to negotiate the return of the occupied territories, but they were unsuccessful. In October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur. This war went on for several weeks, and many lives were lost on both sides. Israel did not lose control of its occupied territories, and they managed to decimate the opposing armies yet again. This war did not result in any major shifts in territory, but psychologically it is very important. This war contributes even today to the Israeli feeling that they are under constant threat from their neighbors. This attitude has a direct impact on how Israel behaves toward its Arab neighbors and especially toward the Palestinians.

Palestinian Nationalism

From the 1960’s, Palestinians began to accept that their fate truly was in their own hands. The international community and the Arab states both seemed unwilling or unable to help their cause. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was borne from these sentiments. The PLO provided social and governmental services to the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank, and had an army and a legislative council Ea pseudo-government. Several distinct political parties emerged and were represented in the PLO during the late 1960’s and the early 1970’s Ethe Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Yassir Arafat’s Fateh, and the Palestine People’s Party, among others. After much political wrangling with the Palestinian people over the legitimacy of the PLO as a Palestinian-based entity (it was essentially created by the Arab League and at first seemed constrained by the Egypt and Jordan), the PLO was recognized by the Arab states and the Palestinian street as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. It was also granted UN Observer status in 1974.[13] Soon, the PLO became the primary way for Palestinians to express their desire to be free from Israeli occupation and to return to their homes.

Despite the growing nationalist movement, Palestinians still saw their aspirations for independence and justice frustrated time and again. One reason for this was because Israel declared the PLO illegal, and they expelled its leaders. This declaration made peaceful negotiation between the two principle enemies virtually impossible. Additionally, Arab leaders around the Middle East often publicly claimed to support the Palestinian cause, but did little in the way of action to help them achieve their goals. Israeli military rule, at the same time, became more and more harsh as curfews, closures, restrictions on free press, and military rule continued year after year. For everyday Palestinians, the future seemed bleak.

As the Palestinians continued to face military oppression, their hopes were raised and dashed several times, and their anger at not living a free life like their Israeli neighbors finally began to boil over. After a meeting of the Arab League in which virtually no mention of the Palestinian problem took place in late 1987 (after twenty years of Israeli occupation), and an Israeli military truck killed four Palestinian civilians, a large demonstration began in Gaza. The demonstration continued the next day, and spread rapidly to Jerusalem and the West Bank. The 1987 intifada had begun.

The intifada began as a well-organized, generally peaceful movement of passive resistance against the Israelis. Palestinians refused to pay Israeli taxes in many areas, organized boycotts of Israeli products, created semi-governmental institutions to perform tasks the Israeli government had theretofore performed, and large, relatively controlled protest marches continued for several weeks. The protests sometimes became violent, when Palestinians attacked Israeli military installations.

The Israeli response consisted of a large military crackdown. Aggressive anti-demonstration tactics included firing tear gas and rubber-coated steel bullets into crowds, and they eventually took on the strategy of breaking bones instead of firing live rounds to subdue, thereby minimizing the death toll. The Israeli government then imposed “pro-activeEtactics on Palestinian civilians: increased restrictions on movement, extended periods of total closure of the territories, house demolitions (bulldozers destroy houses where suspected activists and their families live), and imprisonment or even assassination of suspected leaders. Some of these tactics are clear violations of the Geneva Conventions prohibiting collective punishment and state-sponsored assassination. Israel, determined to provide security for its citizens, in fact managed to imprison the elite of the resistance, meaning that in the later years of the intifada (1990-1992), it became more violent and less organized.

In any event, the international community could not ignore the Palestinian problem any longer after the outbreak of the intifada.

Israel, under pressure from the international community, became ready to negotiate with the then-outlawed PLO, and did so through a secret channel in Oslo. After much negotiation, mediated by the Norwegians, and particularly by Terje Larsen, in 1993, Yassir Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin (then Prime Minister of Israel) signed the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles. The DoP represented a major change in the situation in the Occupied Territories. The PLO received recognition from Israel, and very significantly, the PLO affirmed Israel’s right to exist while denouncing all forms of terrorism to achieve its goals. In addition, Israel agreed to incrementally give control of the West Bank and Gaza to the newly formed Palestinian Authority, with the understanding that an independent Palestinian State would eventually be formed. The accords left for another time discussion of the “final status issuesEof Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, and Israeli settlements in Palestinian areas.

Among both Palestinians and Israelis, there were varying opinions about the agreement. Many Israelis were elated that there would be an eventual withdrawal from the territories, while others were enraged that Israel was giving up any land at all. Some Palestinians saw the agreement as their ticket to statehood; others saw it as a trap. In any case, almost immediately after the signing of the agreement, the timetable for the incremental release of territory to the PA was not honored by Israel. The first stage of the “redeploymentEof Israeli troops and the turnover of land to the PA did not take place until 1994 (five months behind schedule) after the signing of another agreement amending the timetable.

Soon after this redeployment, Israeli Prime Minister Rabin was assassinated by one of his own people. A shock to the Israelis, this event put the Oslo-defined peace process on hold. The resulting confusion led to an outburst of violence, and an increase of Israeli fears. This increased fear among Israelis led to the surprise election of a very conservative, right wing Prime Minister to replace the left wing, liberal Rabin EBinyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu was less willing to implement Oslo than his predecessor, and he dragged his heels. Israeli settlement activity continued in the territories, a new controversial tunnel underneath the Muslim Quarter of the Old City leading to the Western Wall opened; “settler onlyE roads were built across the West Bank dividing it into five distinct segments and further decreasing territorial continuity.

For everyday Palestinians, Oslo’s “peace processEbegan to mean that the Israelis controlled their lives even more. Although they felt exuberant at the raising of their flag over their major cities in the first handover of territory in 1994, by 1996, it was clear that their zones of independence would be separated by larger zones of Israeli control. This means that it became much harder to travel between any two points in the West Bank, between Jerusalem and Ramallah, for example. These travel restrictions both constrained personal freedom of movement and also hurt economic growth. What’s worse, the Palestinian Authority cooperated with Israeli security forces, meaning that Palestinians began fighting against their own people. What seemed like a step forward in Oslo soon Eto the average Palestinian Eseemed like two steps backward.

As Israel continued to delay implementation of Oslo, Arafat and Netanyahu and later Prime Minister Ehud Barak signed more agreements amending the timetable of troop redeployments and territorial transfers. Eventually, in late 1999, the time for the handover of territory ran out, and Israel still hadn’t withdrawn from all of the territory they had promised. In their refusal to keep their commitment to transfer more land to the Palestinian Authority, the Israelis cited further Palestinian violence and Palestinian failures to live up to their side of the Oslo Accords (having to do with security cooperation and a lack of violence).

A major problem for Arafat and the PA here were the right wing groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad, both of which opposed the Oslo Accords. They used “armed resistance,Eor terrorism, to ensure that the “peace processE would not continue as it had. Since the Israelis insisted on calm before redeploying troops and giving more territory to PA control, Hamas and Jihad were able to disrupt the Oslo process by creating violence. Still, the level of violence in 1999 and early 2000 was relatively very low, and the prospects for peace still seemed good. Optimism reigned.

A period of uncertainty and strange calm settled over the region, and US President Bill Clinton began to work feverishly for a new, final agreement. Palestinians continued to assert that Israel needed to fulfill its promises Efor troop redeployment and safe passage routes between Gaza and the West Bank, for example Ebefore negotiations on any other issues could take place. The Americans continued to pressure both sides to resume negotiations. The Israelis were ready to negotiate, but the Palestinians argued that they would be re-negotiating for what they had already been promised by the Israelis Ethe territory and other provisions of the Oslo Accords.

In this climate, a summit at Camp David began in the summer of 2000. This summit was designed to provide a final agreement on the tough issues left for the end of the Oslo process: Jerusalem, refugees, and settlements. The Palestinians indeed did find themselves negotiating for what they had already been promised by the Israelis Ewithdrawal from the West Bank, safe passage, and so on. Now, they were asked to compromise on Jerusalem, refugee right of return, and other “final status issuesEin exchange for what they had already been promised in terms of territory and independence. Barak offered Arafat “compromisesEof his own, including on the city of Jerusalem, which Israel insists is its “eternal and undivided capital.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> Barak offered Arafat some “functional autonomyEover Palestinian neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Arafat insisted Barak was offering the Palestinians what they already had: functional autonomy over Arab East Jerusalem. Indeed some of the Jerusalem land that Barak offered to Arafat was originally Palestinian suburbs of Jerusalem annexed by Israel in a redrawing of Jerusalem city limits. In return for this “historic compromise on Jerusalem,EBarak asked that Arafat in return give up sovereignty over the Dome of the Rock, give up the right of return for Palestinian refugees, and only receive some 90% of the West Bank, the remaining 10% being used by Israel for “securityEand illegal settlements. Arafat refused, saying that his people would never accept such an agreement, and the summit collapsed in July 2000.

The collapse of this summit left the Oslo process in shambles. There was no direction for the “next step.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> An uneasy truce seemed in place, as no violence erupted after the end of the summit. This is the political environment into which I ventured in August 2000. I went to Jerusalem, and began learning the basic history of the conflict, which I just related to you. I also learned much about Israel that you cannot learn in textbooks, and I will try to give some of those insights below in my discussion of the latest developments in the search for peace in Palestine.

Personal Interpretation

I arrived in Jerusalem, having read much history and having watched much news on the current situation. For three and a half weeks, I lived in a small hotel in East Jerusalem, just a block from Damascus Gate and the Old City. Right on the “Green LineE separating East and West Jerusalem, I had the opportunity to spend each day in both West and East Jerusalem. My time there quickly brought home the real meaning of the history I had learned E there is an unbelievable inequality between Palestinians and Israelis. That much was palpable from the first day in Jerusalem. Touring the West Bank (albeit briefly), Israel, and seeing human faces, hearing real people tell me their stories brought the impact of this conflict home to me very quickly and very powerfully. I will try to relate some of my most significant insights to you now through some carefully conceived generalizations and some specific examples.

The Israelis constantly feel the impact of over fifty years of conflict. Many are weary of war and want the conflict to end. Nearly everyone in mainstream Israeli culture either served in the military or knows someone who is serving or has served. Just about everyone has a war story that defines his or her life. Because of all this, and because of the perception of persecution by the rest of the world (and particularly their Arab neighbors), most Israelis don’t feel safe in their own homeland. For this reason (if not for an altruistic personal commitment to humanitarianism and justice), most Israelis want to see an end to the conflict. Still, in spite of this strong desire, I found that in large part because of their overriding insecurity, many Israelis seem unprepared to make major compromises on the main obstacles to peace. Let me give you some examples.

While living at Kibbutz Tzora (between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, near Bet Shemesh), I met a man who told me about life on the kibbutz during the 1973 “Yom Kippur War.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> He wept openly at remembering friends who died in the conflict. Like most Israelis, he wants peace badly, but at times of intense violence and conflict like late 2000 and 2001, even leftist, liberal Israelis like this man at Kibbutz Tzora feel less willing to compromise. He spoke of the need for security and not making too many compromises. I heard this sentiment echoed several times around the kibbutz.

Watching the evening television news with my host family on the kibbutz proved to be both interesting and depressing. My host father, a former Detroiter who has lived in Israel for about 25 years, translated the Hebrew for me. At the same time, he talked about how Arafat was evil and “can’t be trusted.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> He blamed Arafat for the most recent outburst of violence, saying that “the ArabsEplanned to begin a violent uprising to force Israel’s hand in the peace negotiations. In other words, my host father, whom I found to be very open-minded and committed to peace, said that Israel shouldn’t “reward the violenceEand give the Palestinians what they wanted right now. His usually liberal beliefs became radically more conservative during this violent period. His optimism faded Ehe often half-jokingly asked when I was going to leave the country and he talked about how “things will get much worse here before they get better.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> This statement, which my host father made several times, represents this deep-seeded insecurity I believe most Israelis feel. This insecurity comes out in force at times like this and makes Israelis in general less willing to support peace.

It was difficult to understand how it was so casual, so easy, for the Israelis to live in a country so flagrantly oppressing the Palestinians. But soon, watching the news and seeing more and more Palestinians killed by Israeli soldiers seemed almost like watching the same news from across the world in America Eit was somewhere else, in another place. Not 20 minutes down the road and involving someone’s son or daughter.

Perhaps describing the amazing inequality that exists between Israelis and Palestinians would be helpful in explaining this detached mentality that I often witnessed. Nowhere is that inequality more apparent than in Jerusalem. West Jerusalem is essentially a European city, complete with dozens of cultural museums, a large mall, a sports stadium, office buildings, restaurants, and cozy subdivisions. East Jerusalem, in stark contrast, has no museums, very few modern buildings, and the people are not free to go and live as they please. Israelis in Jerusalem live in a free, modern state with all the trimmings. Palestinians in Jerusalem live under the constant watchful gaze of the Israeli military, have trouble finding work, are denied freedom of movement, often can’t get identity papers, and they often are denied permits to build houses or new shops.

What’s most telling about this place, though, is that very few Israelis ever cross over to the East side. Even Israeli cab drivers refuse to take passengers to the Palestinian side. Israelis simply don’t know anything about East Jerusalem or the people who live there. They’re ignorant about Palestinian culture. Often, they dehumanize the Palestinians. Some of the language my Israeli friends used to describe the Palestinians reminded me of the racist language some white Americans use when talking about minorities in America Elots of talk about “those peopleEand “them.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> Many Israelis on Kibbutz Tzora were surprised to learn that I had Palestinian friends. Some were curious about Palestinians, eager to hear the Palestinian take on the issues. Some Israelis, including a settler in Efrat (just south of Jerusalem), even expressed a desire to meet Palestinians, but they felt that they were unsafe in East Jerusalem or anywhere in the territories. Again, that basic insecurity kept them from branching out to meet “the other.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> It was very reminiscent of racism in America for me. And Israel must be very much like how the American South was during segregation, or how South Africa was during apartheid.

Israelis, in other words, unlike the Palestinians, are able to live their lives without too much thought about Palestinian life. Palestinians, though, cannot ignore the Israelis. Through tough policies, economic domination, and just by seeing Israeli soldiers whenever they go from home to work or from city to city, Israelis are always present in Palestinian life. The Palestinians, therefore, know a lot about their neighbors. Just like in any other superior/subordinate pair, the subordinate group knows more about their oppressors than vice-versa.

Unfortunately, I did not get to spend too much time with Palestinians. Originally, I planned to spend a few weeks in Beit Sahour (a suburb of Bethlehem), but due to the start of the new intifada, I could not. I did manage to visit some of my friends from our small hotel in East Jerusalem in December 2000, and we talked a lot about politics and life in general. Again, here are some very broad generalizations from my conversations with these guys and some other encounters with Palestinians during my stay in Jerusalem and Kibbutz Tzora.

At first, I expected to meet with anger and resentment from Palestinians at my status as an American. Since I represented a country that helped Israel, I thought that it might be difficult for Palestinians to sit with me, person to person, and talk. Nothing could have been further from the truth. On more than one occasion, I saw how Palestinians treat strangers like myself. I was welcomed into the home of a shopkeeper in Nazareth, and also to a family home in Jerusalem. I was always offered coffee or tea, and enormous amounts of food. We chatted for hours. We talked about life, politics, family. Palestinians, I learned, are very family and village oriented. Everyone looks out for their neighbors, treating them as family. The lifestyle in Palestine is very different from the Western European culture that dominates Israel.

Despite this apparent welcoming attitude Eeven toward a complete stranger and an American, like myself EI found that many Palestinians truly despise their Israeli neighbors. I once heard a waiter at the Jerusalem Hotel talk about how he believes that the Holocaust was faked or at least exaggerated for sympathy. Another time, one of my Palestinian friends expressed his firm belief that Israelis are scared of Palestinians because they “know they don’t belong here.Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> This man said that it is possible that someday they may live side by side in peace, but there is no way he could ever be friends with an Israeli. Much like the Israelis, the Palestinians I met were unwilling to meet with Israelis even informally. For the Palestinians, it wasn’t fear but hatred that kept them from braving the great divide. This racism toward Israelis and Jews seemed to me very reminiscent of the racism that black sometimes Americans feel toward white Americans Ethis is the racism that the oppressed feels toward the oppressor.

Still, it seems to me that most Palestinians very much want peace. They want a normal life Eor perhaps more accurately, a life more like the IsraelisE They want freedom of movement, of expression, and to live and work without having to pass through Israeli checkpoints every day. They want the opportunity to earn a living, and to go to worship where they please. Essentially, they want basic rights that the Israelis currently deny them. I think that most Palestinians reject violence on a personal level, but recognize that some violence may be necessary to overthrow the tyranny they have been enduring for over 50 years now. Still, Palestine is so small that nearly every Palestinian I met personally knew someone who had been injured or killed in the recent violence Eand they wanted the conflict to end with a just peace.

Let me temper what I have just said with the caveat that these generalizations come from what I observed while in Israel and Palestine, but I recognize that opinions on both sides vary widely. Not all Israelis want peace, and neither do all Palestinians. Indeed, the right-wing conservatives on both sides keep this conflict going. Still, I think the extreme right-wing opinions are in the minority on both sides. Most people want peace. Unfortunately, during periods of violence, the right-wing groups gain significant political power. For example, on the Palestinian side, Hamas and Islamic Jihad have continued to derail attempts at peace negotiations by using violence (despite Arafat and the PA’s call for ceasefires). This violence is always blamed on the PA, and the Israelis refuse to “negotiate under fire.E/p>

As for the Israeli side, one of the right-wing conservatives keeping the conflict going is Ariel Sharon. He took 1,000 armed guards to the Dome of the Rock on September 28, 2000, in what he called a mission of peace. In fact, he knew that this visit would stir up Palestinian anger at the fact that he Eas an Israeli, a non-Muslim, and someone accused of being responsible for massacres of Palestinians Espan style='mso-spacerun:yes'> this man could go to the Dome of the Rock while millions of Muslims are denied that right by Israel. This was the spark that started the newest intifada. Perhaps it is a coincidence that this renewed violence turned Israeli public opinion around from liberal to conservative. Perhaps it is coincidence that a few weeks after Sharon’s visit to the Dome of the Rock, he was elected Prime Minister.

After the beginning of violence, it was only a matter of days before I was forced to leave Israel and cut short my trip. This disappointment still saddens me today. Still, I was one of the lucky ones. I was able to leave.

Final Thoughts

The current situation appears bleak. The failure of diplomacy coupled with intensified violence has even veterans of the conflict puzzled and pessimistic. But, it seems to me, that since people on both sides want peace, that peace will eventually come.

Allow me to close on a personal note. Living in Israel and Palestine, albeit briefly, has changed me in ways I still do not understand. Seeing conflict up close, and seeing how it tears apart people on both sides, has changed what I thought was important. The oppression of the Palestinians, the humiliation and dehumanization that they constantly endureE and the fear of everyday Israelis about the possibility that the bus they take to work might blow upEthese sad facts weigh heavily on my mind. Something must be done to end the occupation and to begin to give the Palestinians basic human rights and a “normalElife. Only then will both sides truly know peace and coexistence.

It is my hope that this paper has served as a basic introduction to the Palestinian/Israeli conflict. Obviously, there is much more to be said that could not fit in these pages. Despite my clearer understanding of the conflict after 6 months of intense study, I feel more puzzled now than ever before about the meaning of history in this conflict. I find it much harder to predict the future of the conflict. Still, I remain confident that with time, this too shall pass.